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How Money for Legal Scholarship
Disadvantages Feminism∗
Martha T. McCluskey

Abstract
A dramatic infusion of outside money has shaped legal theory over the last several decades,
largely to the detriment of feminist theory. Nonetheless, the pervasive influence of this funding is
largely ignored in scholarly discussions of legal theory. This denial helps reinforce the marginal
position of feminist scholarship and of women in legal theory. Conservative activists and funders
have understood the central role of developing community culture and institutions, and have helped
shift the prevailing framework for discussion of many questions of theory and policy through
substantial investments in law-and-economics centers and in the Federalist Society. Comparing
the institutional resources and structures of support for feminist or gender scholarship to those
developed for economic analysis of law focused on free-market or neoliberal policy and business
interests reveals substantial differences. Further, much of this conservative institution building has
been dominated by men and has served to promote legal scholarship by white men in particular. I
conclude by considering how feminist legal scholarship might better develop institutional support
despite access to much less money.
KEYWORDS: legal theory, jurisprudence, law and economics, Olin foundation, feminism, feminist legal theory, Federalist Society, critical legal studies, critical race theory, Cass Sunstein,
Richard Posner, gender, law schools
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In the last several decades, feminist legal theory has flourished as one of a
number of schools of thought reexamining law’s basic principles, methods, and
social functions.1
Courses, scholarship, journals, and advocacy focused on
feminism have become an established part of the legal landscape. Despite these
accomplishments, however, feminism’s place within theory, practice, and
teaching remains largely marginal and subordinate.
In contrast, Law and Economics has emerged from among these recent
movements as a powerful, if not dominant force in U.S. legal theory, teaching and
policy. The overlapping, but more explicitly conservative Federalist Society has
grown from an outpost for radical views to an inside power broker reshaping
much of the U.S. legal profession, judiciary, government and legal academia.
One important reason for these different outcomes is that the intellectual
energy and reach of feminist legal theory has not been matched with the material
and institutional support available to other recent movements. Feminism gained
its foothold in law just as legal academia, theory, and law reform became a major
focus for economic investment and organizing by conservative activists in the
Compared to other countries, the distinctive strength of
United States.2
conservative legal movements like Law and Economics in the U.S. matches the
distinctive economic support for those movements here.
Feminist entrepreneurship, energy and intellectual power has helped to
sustain feminist scholarship in the face of this enormous infusion of money to
marginalize or oppose egalitarian legal ideas. Nonetheless, to move forward
effectively, feminist legal theory will need not only to continue its creative,
rigorous, and bold analysis of law and gender, but also to step up its efforts to
strategically mobilize and nurture the institutional and material resources vital to
being heard, engaged, and implemented.
I. Presuming a Non-Material World of Legal Theory
Legal theory is not only a market of competing ideas, but a market in which ideas
are bought, sold, and targeted for investment to procure political and economic
gain. Yet the economics of legal theory barely surfaces in polite scholarly
conversation.
Understanding feminist legal theory’s current and future
1

See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, ED., TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW:
GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY (2010) (collecting essays reflecting on the
development and future of feminist legal scholarship after twenty-five years of the Feminism and
Legal Theory Project). The prolific and passionate “feminist law professors “ blog, for example,
lists more than 200 affiliated law faculty. See Feminist Law Professors,
www.feministlawprofessors.com (last visited June 23, 2010).
2
STEVEN TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL
OF THE LAW (2008).
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challenges requires digging deeper into the question of how money shapes the
success and substance of competing legal theories.
Scholarly discussion of this recent rise and fall of diverse legal theories
has tended to focus mainly on the relative intellectual strengths of the ideas, such
as their originality, rigor, or usefulness for policy and legal practice. Questions of
“failures” and “distortions” in the “market for ideas” often focus on individual
scholars’ intellectual and moral imperfections, or on the ways in which individual
scholarly choices are based on emotional factors, imperfect information, or social
approval.
Answering the question why Critical Legal Studies “disappear[ed],” while
Law and Economics and the Federalist Society have prospered, prominent legal
scholar (and federal “regulatory czar”) Cass Sunstein explains that the “market”
for legal theory can be skewed by “fads, fashions, and bandwagon effects.”3 He
describes how ideas about good legal theory get shaped by irrational and
unintended “cascade effects” such as habit, reputational pressures, imperfect
information, mass psychology and emotional ties. For example, he notes that
feminism succeeded in the mid-1980s because of an “informational cascade”
whereby skeptics who had not themselves carefully investigated the truth of
feminism’s underlying claims came to nonetheless accept feminist legal theory as
valuable mainly because many others thought so.4
He describes a similar
phenomenon with the contemporary predominance of Law and Economics at the
University of Chicago, where the simple fact of ubiquitous exposure steers new
faculty and students to a particular version of economic thinking.5 Sunstein
observes that it takes confidence for any individual scholar to assert her own
skepticism in the face of prevailing trends.6
In this examination of psychological and discursive digressions from
intellectual merit, Sunstein stops short of considering the distorting influence of
money and institutional resources. He does acknowledge that individual scholars
reasonably depend on reputation and other non-intellectual influences in choosing
their ideas and arguments.7 He also notes that “external shocks... outside of the
[legal] academic domain” have a role in stopping or starting intellectual
bandwagons, acknowledging that legal theory responds to market “demand” not
just from other law scholars but from a broader set of consumers.8 Yet he limits
his view of these external influences on legal scholarship to changes in the federal
3

Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, On Academic Fads and Fashions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1251
(2001).
4
Id. at 1255.
5
Id. at 1256.
6
Id. at 1255.
7
Id. at 1257.
8
Id. at 1253.
2
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judiciary, hot-button political issues, and trends in other academic disciplines.9
He identifies the “consumers” whose demand influences the supply of legal
theory as those with largely professional rather than overtly financial or political
interests or agendas: “other academics, students, government officials, judges,
and law clerks,”10 not (for example) business interests, upper class interests,
ideologically-oriented foundations and think tanks, or conservative activists.
This vision of a “market” for theory mostly removed from direct material
interests and political power is particularly striking in a contemporary
jurisprudential context in which it is standard scholarly fare to critique the
economic interests beneath righteously defended principle, thanks to the success
of Law and Economics. Indeed, Judge Richard Posner, a founding figure of Law
and Economics, has dismissed as “extreme” and absurd the idea that this
movement’s success rested on lavish funding by conservative foundations rather
than on intellectual merit, or that other movements’ relative weakness is related to
lack of foundation funding.11 To support this sweeping claim, Posner asserts that
“[f]oundation or government grants are indeed vital in many areas of natural
science and some areas of social science, but they are not vital to research
conducted in law schools or to purely theoretical investigations by economists.”12
Sunstein similarly distinguishes what he sees as the non-material interests
driving the market for legal theory from typical markets, noting that “no one pays
directly for what academics produce.”13 He explains that the journals that publish
law scholarship “usually do not compensate contributors for articles and
essays,”14 and though authors may be paid for books, “little money is usually
involved.”15 Nonetheless, Sunstein acknowledges that “indirect compensation –
monetary and nonmonetary—is omnipresent.”16 He acknowledges that job
opportunities and (in part) salary directly depend on scholarly output.17 But he
quickly glosses over these direct material incentives to emphasize the importance
of invitations to scholarly events as the primary kind of non-intellectual factor that
“disciplines academic activity.”18 He treats these influences as social and
psychological phenomena that can skew the production of ideas away from pure
9

Id. at 1261-63.
Id. at 1253.
11
Richard A. Posner, Comment on Lempert on Posner, 87 VA. L. REV. 1713, 1714-15 (2001).
Posner appears to take a somewhat different view of the significance of money in scholarship
elsewhere, however. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
12
Posner, supra note 11, at 1715.
13
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1253.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 1254.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
10
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merit, even though tenure and other academic structures may insulate ideas from
outside material pressures.19
This non-material picture of the question of biases in legal theory begs
three questions. First, it leaves unanalyzed the extent to which money actually
does directly shape the production of contemporary legal scholarship. Second, it
fails to examine the ways in which the omnipresence of indirect material
influences on legal scholarship have constrained and controlled ideas about law.
Third, this analysis suggests that the biases in the “market” for legal theory are
ideologically and economically neutral or random, because it abstracts the biases
in this “market” from larger socioeconomic structures and power inequalities.
Sunstein portrays feminism, critical legal theory and Law and Economics as
seemingly equal examples of how legal theories occasionally benefit from
reputational biases,20 without comparing the depth, breadth, interrelationships and
nature of the impact of non-intellectual factors on these different schools of
thought. By situating the market for legal theory in the broader socioeconomic
context, we can better see how the non-intellectual influences on theory are
instead systemically and dramatically skewed against feminist legal theory (and
other egalitarian legal theories) and in favor of Law and Economics and other
conservative movements.
Not only does this standard picture of competing legal theories stop short
of intellectual engagement with questions of the material influence, but it also
risks contributing to an academic culture in which those questions are outside the
bounds of intellectual inquiry. As Sunstein’s discussion of reputation in
scholarship explains, if prominent scholars repeatedly and systematically dismiss
questions of monetary influence as absurd, and if these questions are treated as
crass personal attacks rather invitations to sophisticated analysis, serious
intellectual evaluation of the issue is likely to be deterred.
II. Outside Funding for Scholarship
The vast inequalities of money in legal theory probably have skewed many
scholars’ choices away from focusing on gender and toward interests and
ideologies likely to undermine feminist perspectives and goals. In addition, this
lack of outside funding means that feminist legal scholarship is likely to get less
attention, prestige, and distribution than more well-funded schools of thought.

19
20

Id.
Id. at 1255-56.
4
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A. Directly Funding Legal Scholarship for Economic and Political Gain
1.

Money for production, publication, and distribution of legal
scholarship

Although, as Posner and Sunstein observe, most scholarship in law reviews is
funded generally by law faculty salaries,21 direct payment for individual research
and publication from outside groups with material interests in the subject matter is
a significant and probably growing trend. A 2008 study of law review articles in
the Westlaw database found about 12,000 (out of 441,170 total) that explicitly
acknowledged funding by government, industry or interest groups.22 Outside
funding for scholarship from business and advocacy groups is particularly likely
to differ from typical grants from general university or government research funds
by being orchestrated to advance specific ideologies or interests.
In one widely discussed example of hired scholarship, Exxon Corporation
extensively funded research and publications critical of punitive damages during
its protracted appeal of a multibillion dollar punitive damage award for the Valdez
oil spill.23 Indeed, Sunstein was one of several law scholars who acknowledge
receiving an unspecified amount of Exxon’s largess for scholarship useful to
those supporting restrictions on jurors’ punitive damage awards.24 Even though
the Supreme Court claimed to discount the Exxon-funded research,25 this
scholarship has been highly influential in promoting opposition to punitive
damages in policy, litigation, and academic discussions.26
Funds for recruiting and developing legal scholarship to support specific
litigation or policy results have been provided not just by individual businesses,
but also by advocacy groups or foundations with missions and funding explicitly
linked to the interests of large corporations. One example is the Pacific Legal
Foundation, a national “public interest” litigation firm that describes its mission as
promoting “limited government, property rights, individual rights and a balanced

21

See supra notes 11, 12, & 13 & accompanying text.
Shireen A. Barday, Punitive Damages, Remunerated Research, and the Legal Profession, 61
STAN. L. REV. 711, 713 & n. 5 (2008).
23
See Deborah Rhode, The Professional Ethics of Professors, 56 J. OF LEGAL EDUCATION 70, 76
(2006) (citing Alan Zarembo, Funding Studies to Suit Need, L.A. TIMES, Dec.3, 2003, at A1).
24
See Barday, supra note 22, at 720; Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade,
Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law),107 YALE L.J. 2071
(1998); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, & Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want Optimal
Deterrence? 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (2000);CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW
JURIES DECIDE ix (2002).
25
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2626 n.17 (2008).
26
See Barday, supra note 22, at 734, Appendix A (listing judicial citations).
22
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approach to environmental protection.”27 This organization provides up to four
grants of $10,000 a year to U.S. law faculty for production of scholarly articles
advancing that group’s litigation interests.28
In addition to funding individual publications by law school faculty, an
extensive network of well-funded conservative think tanks provides substantial
financial support for in-house staff to produce legal scholarship. For example,
the Pacific Legal Foundation’s web site includes a bibliography of “sponsored
scholarship,” much of which has been produced by in-house attorneys.29 Other
prominent examples include the American Enterprise Institute (listing over
seventy-five staff scholars, including paid positions for resident or visiting
scholars and doctoral student fellowships)30; the Cato Institute (listing over fifty
“policy scholars” on staff)31 and the Independence Institute (listing fourteen
scholars on staff)32. Taken as a group, scholars working for these advocacyoriented organizations have developed an extensive body of work in law reviews
and other academic sources promoting not just only particular policy positions,
but also certain strands of legal theory.
Does this targeted funding matter to the direction and success of legal
theory, given that individual legal scholars are likely motivated by a range of
factors other than direct economic gain (such as concern for truth, justice, or
intellectual rigor and prestige)? In the case of punitive damages scholarship,
funding source strongly predicts substantive position: university and government
funded scholarship overwhelmingly defended punitive damages awards, while
scholarship funded by business interests or business-oriented foundations (not
surprisingly) provided support for corporate defendants’ efforts to reduce punitive
damage awards.33
The problem is not simply that outcome-oriented funding induces
academics to produce substandard, incorrect or fraudulent evidence and analysis.
Even when the funders do not improperly influence the process or results of the
research, and even when the research and analysis is reasonable, the presence of
outside funding steers scholarship toward particular questions and information
useful to particular interests while ignoring competing concerns and evidence.
27

Pacific Legal Foundation: Rescuing Liberty from Coast to Coast, About PLF,
http://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=262 (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).
28
Pacific Legal Foundation, Legal Scholarship: Faculty Grants,
http://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=346 (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).
29
Pacific Legal Foundation, Legal Scholarship: Bibliography of Sponsored Scholarship,
http://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=347 (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).
30
American Enterprise Institute, Contact List of Scholars and Fellows,
http://www.aei.org/scholars (last visited June 23, 2010).
31
Cato Institute; Experts, http://www.cato.org/people/experts.html (last visited June 23, 2010).
32
Independence Institute, Staff, http://www.i2i.org/staff.php (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
33
Barday, supra note 22, at 720 n.33.
6
DOI: 10.2202/1539-8323.1142

McCluskey: How Money for Legal Scholarship Disadvantages Feminism

This steering of information production is especially problematic given a
socioeconomic context of highly unequal resources for private production of
knowledge.
The current lack of transparency about the amount or manner of outside
funding of legal scholarship heightens concerns about the possible impact of
direct payments for scholarship on the substance of individual scholar’s work.
Although the AALS has a “statement of good practice” directing law faculty to
footnote the fact of outside funding for any article submitted to law reviews for
publication, no system has been established by the AALS, law schools, or law
reviews for enforcing this vague guideline, and this guideline fails to specify
disclosure of the amount of the funding or the relationship of the funding to the
publication’s content.34 Judge Posner (writing about the decline of public
intellectuals) has criticized the failure of scholars writing industry-funded
scholarship to disclose the amount of their remuneration, and reports that the law
scholar most often funded by Exxon compared his remuneration to typical
economic consulting fees that Posner estimated at around $1,000 an hour.35
Whatever their other motives, academics are unlikely to be completely immune
from the influence of money, especially at such lavish rates of compensation.
Outside funding targeted to specific outcomes is likely to shape legal
theory and practice not only through the incentive effects of direct renumeration
but also through the impact of funding on nonmonetary rewards such as media
attention and academic prestige. Business interests or advocacy groups that pay
for production of scholarship also are likely to distribute that scholarship to their
lawyers for use in litigation36 as well as to lobbyists, policymakers, the media, and
other academics (particularly though academic centers and organizations
supported by the same funders). This “marketing” can help build recognition
increasing legal scholars’ professional status (particularly when it leads to judicial
citation and invitations to academic events), contributing to benefits such as
higher salaries, job mobility and advancement, and more support for scholarship
as well as further outside funding for research or consulting.37 This connection
34

See Barday; supra note 22, at 732 & n.93.
RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE 394-95 (2003). One legal
scholar who has advocated for tougher disclosure requirements, Susan B. Koniak, reported that
she earned $50,000 for serving as an expert witness over a period of two years in an asbestos class
action case. Richard Lippitt, Intellectual Honesty, Industry and Interest Sponsored Professorial
Works, and Full Disclosure: Is the Viewpoint Earning the Money, or is the Money Earning the
Viewpoint?, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1075, 1083-85 (2001).
36
Barday, supra note 22, at 722-23.
37
Writing in 2003 about law professors’ income-earning potential, the author of a prominent legal
theory blog commented that law professors frequently engage in outside consulting activities for
pay, with some earning $1,000 an hour and “hundreds” earning in the range of $400 an hour.
Posting of Brian Leiter, Leiter Reports: A Philosophy Blog (Oct. 11, 2003),
35
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with resources for distribution also means “scholarship for hire” is likely to have
influence well beyond its relatively small numbers.
Moreover, the Exxon example suggests that in addition to purchasing
scholarship based on desired outcomes in specific cases or legislation battles,
interested industries have sought more far-reaching results by strategically
advancing the work of selected scholars and theoretical approaches. An analysis
of punitive damages scholarship, for example, showed that three prominent law
professors (including Sunstein) accounted for most of the (acknowledged) funded
scholarship, with each of the three receiving funding from Exxon for more than
one publication, and with each already a leading figure in promoting economic
analysis of law at an elite law school.38
Although feminist legal research and writing projects undoubtedly have
benefited from general university and government funding, targeted support for
individual scholarly production of feminist legal theory or work on gender and
law appears rare. No industry organizations, foundations, or interest groups
appear to have systematically funded work by feminist legal scholars comparable
to the funding of scholarship advancing business interests or free-market
ideology. Nor have nonacademic feminist legal advocacy groups regularly (if
ever) offered funding for individual scholarly publications by law faculty. The
Center for Reproductive Rights (a public interest law firm) recently has initiated
an award for legal scholarship promoting its goals, and though this award brings
recognition and opportunities for involvement with the Center, no mention is
made of any monetary payment (in contrast to the awards offered by the Pacific
Legal Foundation).39 Unlike conservative advocacy groups, paid opportunities
for scholarly research and publication within non-academic feminist advocacy
organizations appear rare or nonexistent.
Staff of feminist advocacy
organizations (like the National Women’s Law Center, the National Partnership
for Women and Families, or the National Organization for Women) tend to
produce primarily non-academic publications.
Looking at the specific subject of tort reform as a leading example of
money skewing theory, research on gender equity in the civil justice system has
not received funding for research comparable to scholarship critical of punitive
damage awards. In what appears to be an isolated exception, Lucinda Finley
acknowledges funding from a source related to trial lawyers for her empirical
research exploring the harmful impact on women of restrictions on non-economic
http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2003/10/how_much_money_.html.
38
See Barday, supra note 22, at 720 (discussing funded work by A. Mitchell Polinsky, W. Kip
Viscusi, and Cass R. Sunstein).
39
See Center for Reproductive Rights: CRR Innovation in Scholarship Award,
http://reproductiverights.org/en/project/crr-innovation-in-scholarship-award (last visited Aug. 9,
2010).
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damages.40 Nonetheless, outside funders such as trial lawyers or labor unions do
not seem to have designed their funding to strategically advance and
institutionalize legal scholarship on gender or feminism, for example by targeting
prominent feminist scholars for repeated funding or by aiming to advance
feminist theory more generally.41
2. Money for scholarship time and professional development
More important than payment for individual publications, outside money
selectively supports faculty time for legal scholarship. General universitysponsored fellowships freeing faculty from teaching and administrative duties for
research and writing are relatively rare in legal academia, other than sabbaticals or
pre-tenure research leaves and occasional course relief by a faculty member’s
home institution for extraordinary achievement or special projects. In recent
years, national rankings and other competitive pressures probably have
contributed to increased demands on faculty not just for publication, but also for
increased service to students and for heightened administrative responsibilities
(such as student and faculty recruitment, fundraising, curricular reform, career
services, and public relations). Furthermore, recent budget pressures on
universities often have decreased academic funding available for scholarship time.
Think tanks, foundations, law firms, and advocacy groups providing research
fellowships for scholarship can play an important role in relieving this time
pressure and advancing academic careers now highly dependent on scholarly
productivity.
Scholarly fellowships by nonacademic funders appear highly skewed
toward conservative non-feminist research and writing. For example, the
Federalist Society’s Olin/Searle/Smith Fellows in Law program awards up to
three fellowships of $50,000 a year plus benefits to give “top young legal thinkers
the opportunity to spend a year working full time on writing and developing their
scholarship with the goal of entering the legal academy.”42 In his book The Rise of
the Conservative Legal Movement, political scientist Steven Teles explains how
this Fellows program was designed to explicitly promote conservative scholarship
40

Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children and the Elderly, 53
EMORY L.J. 1263, 1263 n.a1 (2004) (acknowledging the Robert L. Habush Endowment of the
Association of American Trial Lawyers).
41
Tort scholars Martha Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins, for example, reported they have not
received any nonacademic funding for their research and publications on gender and race in tort
law. Email communications with author, Feb. 24, 2010; see MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B.
WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER & TORT LAW (2010) (analyzing case law
showing undercompensation of women and minorities).
42
The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, Olin/Searle Fellows in Law,
http://www.fed-soc.org/aboutus/id.40/default.asp (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
Published by De Gruyter, 2011
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by those “dedicated to the principles of the rule of law and limited government”
and to counter control of existing generalized academic fellowships by faculty
members perceived to lack sufficient right-wing political commitments.43 In
2009, the Federalist Society reported that two-thirds of recipients of the
fellowship now hold tenure-track law faculty positions.44 Individual fellowship
recipients have credited this fellowship with providing networking, knowledge,
and prestige important to their career direction and success.45
In addition, the Federalist Society has recently offered the “Searle Young
Legal Scholars Research Fellowships,” which replace the academic salaries of
two tenure-track junior law faculty in order to provide a semester-long research
leave.46 The Society reports that these fellowships aim not only to increase
scholarly production by junior faculty at schools with relatively heavy teaching
loads and low research budgets, but also to enhance their professional standing so
that they may move to more prestigious schools where “their voices will be
amplified.”47
Fellowship funding has also become a prominent strategy for individual
corporations to advance their direct economic interests in the substantive direction
of legal scholarship. Microsoft has recently begun directly funding law
fellowships to promote scholarship with particular content relevant to its interests
at elite universities. The University of Michigan’s “Microsoft Fellowship in Law,
Economics Technology” explicitly promotes intellectual property research48;
Princeton’s Program for Law and Public Affairs hosts a similar new one-year
funded Microsoft Fellowship;49 and the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology

43

TELES, supra note 2, at 174.
FEDERALIST SOCIETY FOR LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 10
[hereinafter Fed. Soc’y 2009 Ann. Rep.], available at
http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20100416_2009AnnualReport.pdf. See also Teles, supra note 2, at
109-110 (counting 16 recipients).
45
TELES, supra note 2, at 178.
46
Eugene Volokh, Federalist Society’s Searle Young Legal Scholars Research Fellowships (blog
posting), The Volokh Conspiracy, June 3, 2010 http://volokh.com/2010/06/03/federalist-societyssearle-young-legal-scholars-research-fellowships-2/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).
47
Fed. Soc’y 2009 Ann. Rep., supra note 44, at 9.
48
See Michigan Law, Program in Law, Economics and Technology, Fellowships,
http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/lawecontech/Pages/lawecontechfellowships.aspx
(last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
49
Program in Law and Public Affairs, LAPA Fellows Program,
http://lapa.princeton.edu/fellowships.php (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). The 2009-10 Microsoft
fellow is the President of the European Law and Economics Association and received an Olin
Fellowship earlier in his career, see LAPA Fellow, Eli M. Salzberger (profile).
http://lapa.princeton.edu/peopledetail.php?ID=615 (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
44
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hosts another recently established Microsoft research fellowship on intellectual
property.50
In addition to these fellowships explicitly and directly linked to outside
entities with particular conservative ideologies and interests, a number of elite law
schools have used money from the Olin Foundation or other conservative donors
to provide internal fellowships for aspiring or existing law professors for
production of Law and Economics scholarship. For example, the University of
Chicago Law School has had an Olin Student Fellowship since 1984,51 along with
additional fellowships from the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation and the
Bradley Foundation.52 Many of the law students who received scholarships from
the Olin Foundation to pursue Law and Economics at elite law schools have
gone on to become academics.53 One report counted forty-eight law faculty,
including twenty-one at “top-ten law schools” who received Olin fellowships as
students.54
With the goal of continuing the Olin Foundation’s work in Law and
Economics (which ended in 2005), in 2008 the Kauffman Foundation launched a
new fellowship program in six prominent law schools.55 This program provides
up to two years of salary, with benefits and additional funds for scholarly
expenses, to support the careers of new and aspiring scholars focusing on
“economic innovation, entrepreneurship and economic growth.”56 Another new

50

See Berkeley Law, Campaign for Boalt Hall News, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/2286.htm (last
visited July 19, 2010) (announcing the Microsoft fellowship as part of a $1 million Microsoft
grant for research at that law school institute).
51
See The University of Chicago, The Law School, Law and Economics, Student Fellowships,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/studentfellowships.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).
52
Id. Other fellowships at law school law and economics centers do not identify the source of their
funding, but may include outside donors with business interests. For example, NYU Law School
provides fellowships of $60,000 to provide one or two years of full time scholarly study and
writing related to economic analysis of law and public choice theory. See NYU Law, Center for
Law, Economics and Organization, Scholarship, Fellowships, and Prizes,
http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/laweconomics/scholarshipsfellowshipsandprizes/postgraduatefell
owships/index.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
53
Teles, supra note 2, at 109-110 (discussing Olin’s early fellowship program focusing on funding
law degrees for PhD economists ); id. at 189-190 (discussing Olin’s student fellowships at elite
law schools such as Yale).
54
JOHN J. MILLER, A GIFT OF FREEDOM: HOW THE JOHN M. OLIN FOUNDATION CHANGED
AMERICA 77 (2006).
55
See Kauffman Foundation, Kauffman Foundation Invests $10 Million to Cultivate InnovationFriendly Law, Policy, and Legal Scholarship, Dec. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Kauffman Foundation
press release],
http://www.kauffman.org/newsroom/grant-to-cultivate-innovation-friendly-lawpolicy-and-legal-scholarship.aspx (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
56
See, e.g., Harvard Law School, The Kauffman Legal Fellowship 2009-2010, Post-Graduate
Fellowship in Law, Innovation, and Economic Growth,
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program targeting business-oriented scholarship is the Columbia Law School’s
Charles E. Gerber Transactional Studies Program, which provides a two-year
research fellowship designed to allow transactional lawyers to devote time to
scholarship with the goal of moving from practice into academic careers.57
When fellowships are offered through university-based programs,
conservative philanthropists likely forgo some degree of control over scholarship
recipients’ interests and views in exchange for identification with a prestigious
academic institution.58 Olin fellowships have undoubtedly gone to a few scholars
using neoclassical economics to address gender inequity, such as Christine Jolls
and Joni Hersch. However, it seems likely that in most law schools, the Olin
Fellows were selected and supervised by faculty without expertise or interest in
feminist legal theory and that Olin fellowships as a whole have not been a
significant source of support for feminist legal scholarship.59 Moreover, the direct
involvement of nonacademic business leaders in some of the newer fellowships
based in law schools may impede support for feminists or scholars whose work is
perceived to undermine corporate interests. Applicants for New York University
Law School’s 2010-11 Kauffman Fellowship, for example, are selected by a
committee that includes outside advisors to that school’s Jacobson Leadership
Institute for Law and Business.60
Feminist legal theory has developed over the last quarter century without
fellowship programs specifically aimed at providing time for feminist work by
new or established legal academics. The interdisciplinary Radcliffe Institute
(formerly Bunting Institute) Fellowship61 has supported work on gender by a few
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/fellowships/the-kauffman-legal-fellowship-20092010.html (stating that “Kauffman Fellows will analyze the interplay between the need to maintain
predictability under the rule of law, and the need to foster innovation, entrepreneurship, and
economic growth”) (last visited Aug. 12, 2011); see also
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/studentfellowships.html (University of Chicago Law
School fellowship) (last visited Aug. 12, 2011);
http://www.law.nyu.edu/leadershipprogram/kauffmanfellowship/howtoapply/index.htm (NYU
Law School fellowship) (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).
57
Columbia Law School, Research Fellowship,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/deals/resources (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
58
See TELES, supra note 2, at 204-05 (discussing how the Olin Foundation’s support for Law and
Economics shifted elite law schools’ culture to the right despite some diffusion of ideological
fervor).
59
One notable exception is Yale Law Professor and feminist scholar Reva Siegel, who received an
Olin fellowship as a Yale student but whose work is not affiliated with Law and Economics,
perhaps suggesting the relatively liberal or independent nature of Yale’s program. Id. at 190.
60
NYU Law, Jacobson Leadership Program in Law and Business, Apply for the Kauffman
Fellowship,
http://www.law.nyu.edu/leadershipprogram/kauffmanfellowship/howtoapply/index.htm
(last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
61
Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Fellowship Program,
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prominent legal scholars (including Elizabeth Warren and Lucinda Finley), but it
does not target scholarship in law. Recently, the Feminism and Legal Theory
Project’s Visiting Scholar Program at Emory Law School directed by Martha
Fineman has provided non-funded short term residency programs for research and
career development by feminist legal scholars.62
Two newly established opportunities stand out as the rare and perhaps
only sources of paid research for extended time on scholarship related to feminist
legal theory.
Beginning in 2010, the Center for Reproductive Rights is
sponsoring a two-year fellowship (in conjunction with Columbia Law School) for
aspiring law professors specializing in reproductive rights and human rights
(paying $55,000 a year).63 The Williams Institute of UCLA School of Law
(established in 2002) also has provided a one-year teaching fellowship for
aspiring academics focusing on sexual orientation law, and has recently added a
Though
fellowship for public policy research on sexual orientation.64
Georgetown University Law Center’s longstanding Women’s Law and Policy
Fellowship Program also has helped produce many aspiring feminist legal leaders,
its focus is primarily on advocacy work rather than on legal theory and
scholarship.65
Many feminist scholars have nonetheless launched their careers with
substantial help from general paid fellowships offered by individual law schools,
such as the University of Chicago’s Bigelow Fellows program.66 Leadership and
mentoring from senior feminist faculty has sometimes helped make some of these
general fellowship programs especially fertile ground for feminist scholars. For
example, Columbia University Law School’s Associates in Law program attracted
a number of aspiring feminist scholars (including myself) when Martha
Fineman’s Feminism in Legal Theory Project was based at that institution.
Positions targeted to advancing scholars of color, such as Wisconsin’s William H.
http://www.radcliffe.edu/fellowship_program.aspx (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
62
Emory Law, Feminism and Legal Theory Project, Visiting Scholars Program,
http://www.law.emory.edu/academics/academic-programs/feminism-legal-theory/visiting-scholarprogram.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
63
Center for Reproductive Rights-Columbia Fellowship Application, Center for Reproductive
Rights,
http://reproductiverights.org/en/document/center-for-reproductive-rights-columbia-fellowshipapplication-0 (fellowship for 2012-14) (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).
64
See The Williams Institute, Sexual Orientation Law Teaching Fellowship,
http://www3.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/Fellowships/TeachingFellow.html
http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/pdf/TeachingFellowshipAnn2011.pdf (last visited Aug.
9, 2010).
65
See Georgetown Law, Women’s Law and Public Policy Fellowship Program,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/wlppfp/USProgram/index.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
66
Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellowships, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/bigelow/apply (last
visited Aug. 12, 2011).
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Hastie Fellowship program,67 have also produced a number of graduates who
have been influential in feminist legal theory. Despite the benefits of these general
fellowships to feminist scholars, the more targeted fellowship programs have the
advantages of creating a supportive institutional setting likely to be relatively
insulated from institutional change and from changes in individual faculty
availability. Targeted fellowships also can more systematically and effectively
connect fellows to a ready-made pipeline of specialized outside resources,
scholars and opportunities.
B. Funding for Individual Participation in Scholarly Events
Feminist scholars are also disadvantaged by highly unequal access to direct
support for individual faculty involvement in scholarly events. Conferences and
workshops provide valuable opportunities for learning about theoretical
developments, getting feedback shaping ideas and conclusions, and cultivating
references and reviews for tenure and other job opportunities as well as citations
to scholarship. Many academic events require law faculty to pay their own way,
while some provide reimbursement for travel expenses for invited speakers in
particular, and a much smaller number provide honoraria on top of expense
reimbursement. In this context, targeted funding to individual scholars for their
participation in scholarly events is likely to have an impact on faculty choices
about which scholarly interests to pursue and on whose ideas and work gains
substantial attention and influence.
The Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth at
Northwestern University School of Law (focused on studying the impact of
regulation on business) has been particularly generous in paying scholars for
conference attendance and papers. For example, a 2008 call for papers for a
“Research Symposium on Insurance Markets and Regulation” offered law faculty
participants a $6,000 honorarium on top of travel expenses, plus an additional
$1,000 for publication in a law review symposium.68 More recently, a Searle
Center event offered a $1,200 honorarium to law faculty participants, from which
they were expected to cover travel expenses.69 In the 1970s, the Olin Foundation
“invested” heavily in Henry Manne’s Economics Institute for Law Professors,
which funded law professors’ expenses to attend intensive summer seminars
67

University of Wisconsin Law School, William H. Hastie Fellowship Program,
http://www.law.wisc.edu/grad/fellow_hastie.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
68
Call for Papers, Research Symposium on Insurance Markets and Regulation, The Searle Center
at Northwestern University School of Law, April 14 & 15, 2008 (on file with author).
69
Call for Papers, Searle Center –Third Annual Research Symposium on the Economics and Law
of the Entrepreneur, http://www.ssrn.com/update/lsn/lsnann/ann10002.html (inviting papers for
2010 conference held at Northwestern School of Law) (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).
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(initially lasting several weeks) promoting conservative economic ideas.70 Over
several decades since that time, numerous law school centers on Law and
Economics have provided funding for conferences or workshops, and presumably
this support has included substantial funding for individual faculty expenses as
well as some honoraria.
Funding for participation in feminist scholarly events is far more limited,
depending mainly on general university support and individual faculty resources.
During times when general law school funding for faculty conference travel is
squeezed by tight budgets, disparities in funding for involvement in scholarly
events is likely to have particular impact on the direction and tenor of scholarship.
Martha Fineman’s Feminism and Legal Theory Project, now at Emory University,
stands out for its longstanding, regular support of scholarly workshops and other
events building feminist legal theory, but this project generally depends on
participants to fund their own travel expenses. Similarly, LatCrit, along with the
Society of American Law Teachers, has a well developed annual workshop for
junior faculty to cultivate scholarship on race, gender, and sexuality but generally
requires that participating faculty obtain support from their own travel budgets or
salaries.71

III. Money for Scholarly Institutions
Funding for scholarly institutions can influence legal theory more broadly and
deeply than direct funding for individual scholars’ work product, time or
conference participation. Although many law schools have a number of research
centers focused on a variety of subjects, these rarely have the resources and range
of programming typical of Law and Economics centers. Furthermore, although
law schools typically host numerous organizations that provide extracurricular
educational and scholarly activities on a variety of subjects, the Federalist Society
overshadows other groups in its extensive resources and national presence. Even
when law schools support individual faculty members’ work in feminist legal
theory, the relative lack of institutional centers to specifically support this work
locates feminism at the margins of most of U.S. law schools.

70

MILLER, supra note 54, at 66; TELES, supra note 2, at 104-08 (discussing the early years of the
Institute).
71
See LatCrit: Latina and Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., LatCrit/SALT Junior Faculty
Development Workshop,
http://web2.uconn.edu/latcrit/juniorfacultydevwork.php (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).
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A. The Olin Foundation: Institutionalizing Law and Economics
The John M. Olin Foundation’s funding for Law and Economics from the mid1970s through 2005 is perhaps the consummate example of how the flow of
money into academia can have diffuse but substantial impact on legal ideas. A
sympathetic study of the Olin Foundation identified its “heavy investment” in that
approach as perhaps the Foundation’s most significant project, noting that the
total value of that organization’s grants for Law and Economics totaled over $68
million.72 In an earlier (but much more meager) example of philanthropic support
that shaped legal theory, the Russell Sage Foundation provided roughly $5 million
dollars from 1961-1976 to promote the social sciences in legal scholarship,
helping to initiate the Law and Society movement.73 That movement was also
aided by a related grant program for law and social science in the late 1960s and
early 1970s by the National Science Foundation (NSF).74 Despite the importance
of NSF funding for the Law and Society movement, legal scholars largely have
remained a marginal part of NSF funding, and the NSF support has had little
institutional impact on legal academia.75 Analyzing the effect of the Russell Sage
funding, John Henry Schlegel concludes that although it helped shape the interests
of “a surprising number” of Law and Society scholars, it shaped the long term
institutional culture of only one law school (Wisconsin).76

72

MILLER, supra note 54, at 62.
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 248-49
(1995) (listing a grant of $600,000 to the University of Wisconsin; $465,000 to Northwestern,
$765,000 to a number of schools, followed by a later period of about $3 million for residencies to
promote interdisciplinary training by law scholars).
74
Id. at 251.
75
Id. at 252.
76
Id. at 251. Some of the scholars initially funded by Sage or the National Science Foundation
probably did indirectly contribute to an institutional focus on Law and Society later in the 1970s at
other law schools. For example, the University at Buffalo’s hiring of Marc Galanter, who received
funding from the National Science Foundation, contributed to a growing focus of law and social
science at that school in the 1970s, but Buffalo as an institution did not receive any systematic
outside funding for this focus. Conversation with Professor John Henry Schlegel, June 17, 2010.
Nonetheless, the faculty interest in such work contributed to the 1978 establishment of an
endowed institutional program for such research from an individual alumni bequest, the Baldy
Center for Law and Social Policy. See The Baldy Center for Law and Public Policy,
http://www.law.buffalo.edu/baldycenter/about.htm#history (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). Law and
development research in the 1960s and early 1970s is another example of funding for law
scholarship that indirectly fueled left-leaning critiques but that lacked institutional longevity. See
Richard Bilder & Brian C. Tamanaha, Book Review and Note, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 470, 473-75
(1995) (discussing LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, VOL. 2, LAW AND CULTURES (Anthony Carty ed.,
1992), and LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD ( Sammy Adelman and Abdul Paliwala, ed.,
1993)).
73
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1. Political intent and impact of law and economics centers
Olin Foundation’s funding stands out among other funding initiatives not just for
the far greater amount of money it provided, but also for its wide-ranging impact
on numerous legal institutions. Beginning in the mid 1980s, the Olin Foundation
launched a major effort to reshape legal academia, expanding its investments far
beyond its initial focus on individual fellowships, law faculty seminars, and
conservative think tanks.77 Over the next two decades, Olin’s funding was
designed to institutionalize Law and Economics as a central, enduring feature of
elite law schools.78 For example, in the late 1990s, the foundation gave $6
million to Harvard; $1.9 million to Yale Law School, and $2.5 million to the
University of Chicago to enhance Olin centers for Law and Economics at those
schools.79 Following these grants with even larger donations, in 2003 the
Foundation gave $10 million to Harvard’s Law and Economics program, one of
the largest single grants in that wealthy school’s history.80 Also in 2003, Olin
gave a million dollars or more to several other elite law schools, along with sixfigure donations to Chicago, Columbia, Georgetown, George Mason,
Northwestern, University of Southern California, the University of California at
Berkeley, and Cornell.81 After the Olin funding terminated in 2005 (a strategy
designed to preserve tight ideological control),82 other funders with conservative
interests have stepped in to continue support for the Olin funded programs and to
build new institutional centers with similar ideologies. For example, the
Kauffman Foundation announced a $10 million “investment” in Law, Innovation
and Growth in late 2008.83 Microsoft recently has targeted not only individual
faculty fellowships but also broader support for law school programs on
technology, such as its one million dollar gift to the Berkeley Center for Law and
Technology for a “unique partnership” between the company and the law school,
including sponsoring two faculty research projects and organizing discussions
between faculty and Microsoft experts.84
77

TELES, supra note 2, at 187-88.
TELES, supra note 2, at 188-190; 200.
79
Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character,
Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 273-74 (2003).
80
See Olin Gift Expands Law & Economics at HLS, Harvard Law Bulletin, Summer 1998,
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/bulletin/backissues/summer98/article7.html. (last
visited August 12, 2011).
81
See Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the Right’s Rise, 54
BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1231 & n.188 (2007) (citing 2006 Olin Foundation web site posting).
82
MILLER, supra note 54, at 196-201(explaining Olin’s plan to limit the fund to the lifetimes of
his appointed trustees to ensure strictly adherence to his ideological mission).
83
See Kauffman Foundation press release, supra note 55.
84
See Berkeley Law, Campaign for Boalt Hall News, supra note 50. In response to criticism of
Microsoft’s funding of the Google Book Settlement Project of New York Law School’s Institute
78
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The Olin initiative in Law and Economics also stands out among outside
funders of law schools for its explicit (though often strategically couched)
purpose of advancing a conservative political movement.85 The Olin Foundation
consciously adopted this distinctively ideological and instrumental approach to
philanthropy when its founder, the chemical industry executive John M. Olin,
became outraged at militant student protests demanding African American studies
at his alma mater, Cornell University, during the late 1960s.86 Olin then decided
to channel his ample resources away from general university donations to instead
actively target and produce scholars and activists promoting free market
capitalism against what he saw as the threat of socialism and other egalitarian
movements.87 His foundation was designed as a response to a “call to arms” in
defense of “capitalism.”88 The Olin Foundation’s goal was not to promote
economics as an intellectual discipline but to advance a conservative businessoriented ideology.89 Executive Director Piereson explained that the Foundation
focused on Law and Economics because “it seems neutral but isn’t in fact,”
maintaining a “philosophical thrust in the direction of free markets and limited
government.” 90 Piereson also noted the Foundation’s investment choice was
based on recognizing that law school deans would be likely to reject funding for
conservative approaches to constitutional law, but would be more open to the idea
of Law and Economics.91 The Olin Foundation also embraced Law and
Economics because of its potential as a new and far-reaching approach that could
take attention and interest away from more left-leaning theoretical approaches
such as critical legal theory.92
Continuing this approach, the recent funders of Law and Economics
similarly appear to see their mission as fundamentally political rather than
academic. The benefactor of Northwestern’s Searle Center embraced the Olin
model, designing his major philanthropic project to similarly maintain a strongly
conservative political focus with the goal of reducing government regulation of
for Law and Information Policy (headed by a former Microsoft employee) on the grounds that
Google is a leading competitor, a company lawyer explained that this funding is simply one of a
series of grants to legal academics and that the company does not control the outcome of research
funded under such grants. Steven Levy, Who’s Messing with the Google Book Settlement? Hint:
They’re in Redmond, Washington, Wired, March 31, 2009, available at
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/03/whos-messing-wi/ (last visited June 24, 2010).
85
TELES, supra note 2, at 188.
86
MILLER, supra note 54, at 31.
87
Id.at 32-33.
88
James Piereson, Opinion, You Get What You Pay For, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2004 at A10.
89
TELES, supra note 2, at 187-191, 199.
90
Id. at 189.
91
Id. at 188-189; MILLER, supra note 54, at 81 (explaining that in contrast to the subjectivity of
constitutional law, “law and economics is seen as a more objective discipline”).
92
TELES, supra note 2, at 199.
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business.93 In contrast, while funding from the Russell Sage Foundation and the
National Science Foundation contributed to Law and Society scholarship that
often had liberal-leaning political implications, the primary focus and practice of
these programs was academic, driven by an overarching vision of neutral social
science rather than overt political or ideological advocacy.
Olin’s Law and Economics initiative was carefully structured to ensure the
long run impact of its original conservative intent. Adopting a “venture
capitalist” model of philanthropy, the Olin Foundation’s staff and trustees actively
monitored and adjusted Law and Economics “investments” to ensure
“productive” results consistent with the Foundation’s conservative agenda.94 By
providing not just individual grants but a series of major gifts to specific law
schools, and by closely reviewing the political implications and impact of each
gift in the series, the Foundation maintained pressure against straying too far from
the Foundation’s political goals. For example, the Olin Foundation withdrew
funding from Duke University Law School’s John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics after law faculty director Jerome M. Culp criticized what he saw as
“white supremacy” in law.95 In his discussion of Olin’s conservative influence on
law schools, Teles describes how Foundation staff reviewing a proposed Olin
grant for Georgetown negatively weighed the law school’s attempt to discipline a
student for revealing some data on admissions criteria for minority law students.96
This ideological control has not meant Law and Economics centers
operate in lockstep with their funders or with each other. But while some centers
have become known for focusing on developing exceptions or modifications to
neoclassical economics (like behavioral economics) these represent only a small
slice of the full range of economic thought. Despite occasional exceptions, work
on gender remains largely absent from Law and Economics programs, and no
center has emerged as a leader in scholarship on race, gender, labor, consumer
protection, social insurance, or poverty (and, as mentioned above, the Olin
Foundation blocked one director’s attempt to focus on racial inequality).
Consistent with funders’ intent, scholarship supported by existing Law and
Economics centers has been overwhelmingly sympathetic to or compatible with
free-market ideology, providing just enough variation, debate and diversity in
policy positions to also uphold the funders’ goal of constructing this ideological
vision as a neutral or even scientific academic enterprise.
93

See John J. Miller, Daniel C. Searle, R.I.P., NATIONAL REVIEW, Nov. 8, 2007; Kim Dennis,
Commentary, Daniel C. Searle, 1926-2007, PHILANTHROPY MAGAZINE, 35 (Jan.-Feb. 2008).
94
TELES, supra note 2, at 187.
95
MILLER, supra note 54, at 80. Miller asserts the withdrawal of funding was not directly
connected to these words but that Culp’s views on race were “the symptom of a larger problem”
and that the foundation was disappointed in Culp’s “racial politics.” Id.
96
TELES, supra note 2, at 203.
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Furthermore, U.S. legal scholars affiliated with Law and Economics
centers appear overwhelmingly white and male.97 For example, George Mason’s
Law and Economics Center lists a number of programs featuring exclusively male
speakers or experts,98 and no women on a list of experts for its Searle Civil Justice
Institute.99 Also in 2010, Columbia’s Center for Law and Economics Studies lists
two women out of twenty-three affiliated faculty100; Harvard’s John M. Olin
Center lists one woman out of seventeen closely affiliated faculty101; Chicago’s
Law and Economics program lists three woman out of twenty-five affiliated
faculty;102 Stanford’s John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics center lists
one woman out of fourteen affiliated faculty103; and Yale Law School’s John M.
Olin center lists three women out of sixteen faculty concentrating in Law and
Economics.104 Although gender identity should not be taken as a direct reflection
of scholarly ideology or interest, lack of gender diversity in workplaces and
educational institutions is likely to foster harmful gender stereotypes due to
implicit cognitive bias, as Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein have analyzed.105
This underrepresentation risks fostering an academic climate prejudiced against
97

One legal scholar elaborated on this general perception by quipping that the Law and
Economics movement has produced a “a generation of Smart White Guys wielding terms like
“Pareto optimality” who were uninterested in history, culture, subordination, sociology,
psychology, and anything having to do with “distribution.” See, e.g., Angela Harris, Reality-Based
Economics, Posting on SALT Blog, May 20,2010,
http://www.saltlaw.org/blog/2010/05/20/reality-based-law-and-economics/#more-730.
98
See, e.g., Economics Institute for Judges (scheduled for September 2011),
http://www.masonlec.org/events/economics-institute-for-judges-september (last visited Aug. 12,
2011) (6 male speakers); “EconFest for Judges!” (scheduled for October 2011) (16 male speakers)
http://www.masonlec.org/econfest-for-judges-2/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).
99
http://www.masonlec.org/program/searle-civil-justice-institute/experts/ (listing 8 affiliated
experts) (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).
100
Columbia Law School, Center for Law and Economic Studies: Affiliated Faculty,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/law_economics/affiliated_fac (last visited June 25,
2010).
101
Harvard Law School, The John M. Olin Center: Faculty,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/faculty/ (visited July 19, 2010).
102
The University of Chicago, The Law School, The John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics, Faculty, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/node/984 (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
103
SLS, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/opile/#faculty (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
104
Yale Law School, Administrative Law and Public Policy Faculty
http://www.law.yale.edu/academics/adminlawfaculty.htm (listing faculty also described as Law
and Economics faculty) (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
105
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 981-982
(2006) (summarizing social science research). See also Stephen Benard, In Paik, & Shelley J.
Correll, Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood Penalty, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1363 (2008)
(summarizing status characteristics theory explaining how cognitive bias linked to race or gender
identity leads to unequal performance evaluations).
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feminist scholars or feminist scholarship, particularly in the context of the
institutional pervasiveness, prominence, and superior funding for Law and
Economics centers, combined with their ideological tendency to promote the idea
that market success or failure normally reflects merit. It is doubtful that this
underrepresentation is a simple result of lack of women or feminists with interest
in economic policy and theory, thought it is likely a product of ideological bias
against feminism as well as gender bias. When law schools hire faculty to
support their Law and Economics programs, for example, they do not appear to
have tapped into the well-established pool of feminist economists, where they
might find (for instance) scholars like Nancy Folbre (MacArthur “genius grant”
winner writing on welfare, family, and education policy) to balance out
perspectives of economists whose work focuses primarily on the legal interests of
corporations.
The conservative economic ideology, lack of overt gender focus, and
overwhelmingly white and male identity in Olin-spawned Law and Economics
programs have negative effects beyond simply bypassing feminist scholarship. In
addition, these institutional centers also tend to undermine feminist legal
scholarship, despite occasional convergences and despite a tendency toward
agnostic or even accepting attitudes toward feminism in the abstract.
First, the Law and Economics movement has helped to define overall
societal welfare in terms of economic growth presumptively inconsistent with
government action focused on promoting equality, leading to the view that most
law reforms directed at gender equality are suspect, exceptional, or even antiintellectual. This general presumption has reached far beyond faculty specializing
in commercial law or technical economic analysis. For example, a criminal law
scholar, who graduated from law school after Law and Economics had become
well established, explained in a 2008 blog discussion of “social justice” that the
term refers to a preference for promoting “equitable distribution of wealth” over
“maximum growth of wealth.”106 He then noted that “Any mature person realizes
that those are both laudable goals that cannot, unfortunately, be simultaneously
realized.”107 Although this framework creates a “laudable” place for preferring
gender equity, that place is constructed as a costly and partial special interest,
given the corresponding definition that a preference for economic growth
produces universally beneficial and ultimately more cost-effective results in the
long run. Furthermore, this informal comment suggests how the Law and
Economics framework constructs much of feminist scholarship as intellectually
inferior to the extent it is ambitious: the more scholars present gender equity as
beneficial to the long run welfare of society as a whole, not just the temporary
106

Posting of Orin S. Kerr to the Volokh Conspiracy, Dec. 11, 2008,
http://volokh.com/posts/1228966651.shtml.
107
Id.
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special interests of a few, the more it appears immature.108 A study of the impact
on first year law students of faculty emphasizing economic approaches rather than
“humanist” or “critical legal” perspectives found that economic approaches led
students to be more selfish and to define fairness in terms of cost-benefit
calculations of “efficiency” rather than equity.109
Second, the Law and Economics movement has undermined legal
feminism despite appearing to sidestep it because – as its funders intended -- it
has provided seemingly scientific cover for a broader conservative cultural agenda
opposed to gender equality. Law school institutions and faculty focused on legal
economics tend to be be associated with libertarian perspectives that are skeptical
or even hostile to the overt moral conservativism that more openly opposes
feminist legal views. However, cultural conservativism often has been advanced
by more technical economic arguments against government-funded social welfare
programs and government regulation of business. Indeed, the Olin Foundation
designed its funding to further this two-pronged attack on feminism (and other
egalitarian movements), consistent with its leaders’ purpose of directing corporate
profits to “non-egalitarian scholars and writers.”110 In the early 1980s, after a
period of strategic planning, Olin Foundation leaders concluded that free-market
ideology and policy is dependent on conservative morality and culture.111
Alongside its Law and Economics initiative, the Olin Foundation devoted major
funding efforts to scholars and institutions specializing in overt attacks on
feminism and feminist law reforms. For example, the Olin Foundation has
supported individual critics of feminism such as Christina Hoff Sommers, author
of Who Stole Feminism? How Women have Betrayed Women (1994) and
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Commenting on the success of Law and Economics, former Olin Fellow and George Mason
law faculty member David Bernstein notes that it has changed the frame so that any discussion of
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in Law and Economics and Otherwise, Posting to the Volokh Conspiracy, Feb. 26, 2008 9:11 am
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conservative cultural advocacy groups such as the Independent Women’s Forum
and the Center for the Study of Popular Culture.112 Although legal scholarship has
not been the primary focus of this explicitly anti-feminist initiative, legal scholars’
more “objective” and technical economic arguments against feminist law reforms
likely have had more resonance and credibility in a cultural context inflamed by
Olin-funded direct attacks on feminism.
2. Benefits of institutionalizing law and economics
The Olin Foundation’s funding of Law and Economics has had a major impact on
legal theory not just because of its size, scope and political focus, but also because
it was designed to go beyond individualized support to focus on building
specialized academic institutions. By institutionalizing its ideological vision in
law schools, the Olin Foundation provided a wide range of resources to scholars
likely to advance its goals. Consider the 2010 description of Harvard Law
School’s John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business.
The purpose of the center, which is supported by a grant from the
John M. Olin Foundation, is to further student understanding of
law and economics, promote faculty research in the area, and help
make the bar and the public better aware of the economic
approach. The center supports a variety of activities including
fellowships for students at Harvard Law School, research
assistantships, prizes for the best student papers in law and
economics, a seminar series in which invited speakers present
works in progress to students and interested faculty, curriculum
development, conferences, empirical and theoretical research, and
the Harvard Law School Discussion Papers in Law and
Economics. The center also includes a special-purpose program,
the Program on Corporate Governance.113
In early 2010, this Center’s web site listed seventeen affiliated Harvard
Law School faculty, and reported thirty-four scholarly papers in its 2009 “faculty
discussion” series, as well as a dozen more in a “fellows’ discussion papers”
series for 2009; about fifteen course offerings, a previous Law and Economics
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Jennifer L. Pozner, Rally ‘Round the Boys, FAIR (Freedom and Accuracy in Reporting) News,
Sept./Oct. 1999.
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Seminar bringing in weekly outside speakers such as Sunstein and Posner for
presentations and discussions with faculty and students.114
Stanford Law School’s John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics
notes on its home page self-description that it “plays a very active role in the Law
School—and more generally in the university—in promoting interest in the law
and economics movement.”115 That program lists 15 affiliated law faculty, and
boasts that, since its inception, it has had 75 distinguished scholars presenting to
the monthly Law and Economics Seminar, and 257 working papers distributed
through the Olin Program Working paper series.116 The John M. Olin Program in
Law and Economics at the University of Chicago Law School listed twenty-five
affiliated faculty in 2010,117 and also notes that it produces two journals, a
working paper series, a workshop series featuring several presentations a month
by outside scholars, a lecture series, and several conferences a year.118 The Searle
Center on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth reports that over 1,200
scholars, judges, and others attended its programs in 2008-09. 119
These lavishly funded Law and Economics centers have shaped the
substance of legal theory, first, by systematically educating faculty in one
paradigm, encouraging and training them to adopt and develop specific
assumptions, methods, and interests and to focus attention on problems
particularly salient to conservative or free-market economic interests and
ideologies.
These Centers have ensured that new law faculty could become conversant
with Law and Economics with minimal individual effort, and that they could take
advantage of mentoring opportunities not otherwise available.120 Unlike scholars
114

See id. (visited March 4, 2010).
SLS, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
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2010).
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Geoffrey J. Lysaught, Senior Director Policy, Research, and Communications and Chief of
Staff, introduction to the Searle Center (video),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/about-us/ (visited June 23, 2010). In June 2010 the
executive director and senior staff of the Searle Center moved to George Mason Law School.
David Bernstein, Searle Center Directors and Programs Move from Northwestern to George
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in other disciplines, law faculty typically do not begin their careers after long
periods of graduate study under leading legal scholars, making on-the-job
mentoring particularly important.
Second, these institutions likely have encouraged individual faculty
interest in economic analysis by providing funding for attractive social and
emotional benefits such as generous food and drink at workshops. By creating
and supporting a comfortable community of faculty discussing similar ideas and
topics, these centers provide support and recognition for faculty to take positions
that might otherwise be construed as uninteresting, simplistic, radical, or
offensive. Sunstein explains that scholars are more likely to take “extreme”
positions after discussions in groups of like-minded colleagues than as individuals
or in contexts of diffuse and diverse views.121 Henry Manne, whose faculty
seminars in Law and Economics fueled the movement in the 1970s and early
1980s, understood the importance of community support in scholarly
development by requiring faculty to attend the seminars in groups of at least two
from the same law school.122
As Law and Economics has became
institutionalized with centers in virtually every leading law school, scholarship
that might otherwise be considered marginal has become normalized, legitimated,
and associated with elite professional status, as the Olin Foundation intended.
A third, and particularly important way in which such institutional centers
for Law and Economics indirectly shape legal theory is by supporting systems for
distributing scholarship, such as working papers series, seminars, conferences,
and prestigious peer-reviewed journals. With increased requirements for
scholarly production by law faculty, and numerous student law reviews
publishing that work, legal academia is awash in writing that is rarely read or
cited. Centers that provide funding and staffing for circulating and publicizing
scholarship can therefore have substantial impact on the recognition and feedback
given to particular publications and works in progress. For example, the Searle
Center at Northwestern Law School emphasizes its “communication strategies”
designed to bring its research to those who make policy as well as to scholars. Its
Research Director and chief of staff explains the Center staff goes “to great
lengths to ensure that our work product is distributed through a variety of
different channels, including press conferences, policy briefings, and online
communications.”123 Furthermore, the academic impact and prestige of these
centers is likely enhanced by and interrelated with the concurrent funding by Olin
and other activist conservative foundations for the Federalist Society, which has
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extensively supported law school events and scholarly networking systems
promoting free market ideas in legal scholarship.124
Finally, the institutional approach to Law and Economics funding has
helped sustain that movement through changes in individual faculty and
administration. Teles describes how the Olin Foundation actively negotiated with
law schools to ensure their programs would be well integrated into the
institutions, rather than dependent on the interest and availability of individual
faculty and deans. For example, the Olin Foundation procured written assurances
from Stanford Law School’s former Dean Kathleen Sullivan, as well as an
agreement from that university’s president, that subsequent deans would continue
support for the program, with the dean and faculty director also pledging to match
a multimillion dollar Olin grant with their own fundraising.125 Similarly, in 2000,
Olin Foundation staff reported that it had gained the assurance of Yale Law
School’s administration that it would raise an endowment to make the Olin
programs a permanent feature of that school after the termination of Olin
funding.126
In addition, a number of law school centers have boards of non-academic
advisors, primarily drawn from individual businesses and corporate law firms.
The extent to which these non-academic boards have the power to influence the
content of programming or individual funding decisions is typically obscure. This
lack of transparency blurs the lines between independent academic institutions
and interest groups. At the same time, outside boards are likely to help such
centers avoid internal pressures for dilution or distortion of the donors’ original
mission, such as efforts to divert funding to pet projects of Deans or faculty, or
efforts to shift resources to a broader range of scholarly approaches or to general
law school operating expenses.
Finally, funding for long-term institutionalization of Law and Economics
has also taken the form of creating an entire law school. The Olin Foundation
provided George Mason Law School with “a long string of six-figure gifts”127 to
transform into an institution specializing in Law and Economics with sharp
control at least initially on the interests and composition of the faculty.128
Wealthy religious conservatives similarly have founded and developed several
law schools specializing in fundamentalist Christian legal ideas in recent years.129
Needless to say, no law school advertises a similar focus primarily on women,
124
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gender, or feminist ideas. While some of these schools are relatively marginal
within legal education, George Mason has done well in national “rankings” and
also has successfully advanced the careers of new scholars focused on
conservative Law and Economics.
3. Comparison to law school programs for feminist scholarship
Although feminists have organized admirable systems for distributing,
recognizing, and recruiting legal scholarship, these efforts have received far less
institutional and material support than the systems for distributing Law and
Economics scholarship. Law school centers explicitly targeting feminist legal
scholarship are rare. The longstanding Feminism and Legal Theory Project, now
at Emory Law School, is one of the few law school institutions aimed at broadly
advancing feminist legal theory. Like the Law and Economics centers, this
project holds regular workshops and sponsors outside speakers. It has produced a
number of book-length collections of feminist legal scholarship that have helped
define the field, expand its reach, and disseminate its ideas.130 And like the Law
and Economics centers, it has created a social and emotional community as well
as a professional mentoring network that helps attract, encourage, and sustain
scholarly interest. Unlike the Law and Economics centers, however, it does not
identify any major sustained outside funding stream and it probably commands
far less in terms of general law school resources.
Another rare example of institutionalized support for feminism in law
schools is Columbia Law School’s relatively new Center for Gender and
Sexuality Law, which supports a wide range of events for scholars and students
similar to Law and Economics centers, listing eleven affiliated faculty in 2010.131
The Center works with the Columbia Journal of Gender and the Law to publish
some scholarship from the Center’s events,132 it sponsors a new online journal
130
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specifically for student scholarship;133and a blog written by its faculty directors
includes comments on scholarship connected with the Center.134
Although
valuable in feminist circles, these distribution systems generally lack the
resources, prestige and visibility of the faculty-run and professionally staffed
journals affiliated with Chicago’s Law and Economic Center, for example, or the
professionally staffed public relations system of the Searle Center. Furthermore,
these existing organized efforts to circulate feminist scholarship are
disadvantaged compared to similar efforts by Law and Economics centers, simply
because the relatively large number of Law and Economics centers (along with
Federalist Society programs discussed below) create a ready-made national
audience that facilitates repeated presentations of the same paper to numerous
elite law school faculty.
Feminist legal theory also has an institutionalized presence in some law
schools through centers focusing on particular subject areas related to gender and
law. Nonetheless, these tend to be targeted especially to policy advocacy and to
legal practitioners rather than to legal scholarship and theory. For example, the
WorkLifeLaw Center at U.C. Hastings advances research and advocacy
particularly oriented to litigation and legislation on work and family issues.135
Cornell Law School’s Avon Global Center for Women and Justice holds events
and supports student research and an (unpaid) fellowship particularly aimed at
judges and practicing lawyers.136 Finally, some law school institutes covering a
broad range of scholarly subject areas have provided support for feminist
research, but these general funding streams tend to be limited to occasional
conferences or individual research projects and are not geared to long-term
support for developing a particular strand of legal theory and practice.137
In contrast to Law and Economics centers, feminist programs tend to lack
substantial staffing beyond individual law faculty, other than basic clerical
support. Northwestern Law School’s Searle Center, for example, has supported a
former law professor as full-time executive director along with three other senior
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directors, each supervising a team of other staff.138 The Feminism and Legal
Theory Project at Emory and the Columbia Center for Gender and Sexuality both
appear to rely on one or two law faculty members to manage those programs on
top of their general faculty responsibilities, which typically would include not just
teaching and scholarship but general law school administrative service. In
general, without substantial external funding and internal staffing, institutional
support for feminist scholarship is likely to primarily depend on the extraordinary
volunteer efforts of individual feminist faculty likely to be already heavily
burdened by other work and personal demands.139
This relative lack of specialized staffing particularly disadvantages
dissemination of scholarship from feminist and general scholarly centers.
Planning and running scholarly events can require substantial sacrifices in faculty
members’ individual scholarly production or personal time. Although the internet
has in some ways increased the possibilities for low-cost dissemination of
scholarly ideas, maintaining blogs and websites well also takes substantial time
and skill. The Feminist Law Professors blog run by Ann Bartow and Bridget
Crawford,140 and the reproductive rights blog for law professors run by Caitlin
Borgmann,141 depend largely on uncompensated work by law faculty on top of
their regular faculty responsibilities with little institutional support or direct
reward. In contrast, Northwestern’s Searle Center team of paid staff produces
regular email reports on its sponsored scholarship and events, and develops
multimedia presentations for distribution not only to academics but to media
outlets.
Finally, law school institutions promoting feminist scholarship tend to lack
comparable insulation from individual and institutional change. Without ongoing
outside funding and monitoring from ideologically focused donors and advisory
boards, scholarly centers are likely to be highly vulnerable to the shifting interests
and resources of law school faculty, deans and university administrations. As law
schools in general become more dependent on attracting wealthy donors and on
138
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promoting their reputation among prominent judges, deans or law firms, some
may tend to decrease internal support for programs likely to appear controversial,
radical, or peripheral to the concerns of business.
B. The Federalist Society: Organized Conservativism in Law Schools
The Federalist Society represents a second major institutional funding initiative
that has had major impact on U.S. legal academia and scholarship over the
decades since its beginning in 1982 as a law student group. The Federalist
Society now has student chapters in every accredited U.S. law school, along with
lawyers’ groups across the country, and (since 1999) a faculty division; together
these groups served over twelve thousand dues-paying national members in
2009.142 The Federalist Society’s unabashedly ideological and political purpose is
to prioritize and restore “traditional values” and “individual liberty” through “a
conservative and libertarian intellectual network.”143 Though this purpose may
overlap with some forms of feminism, the group’s mission, theory, and practice
generally works against many of the critiques and policy reforms advanced by
feminist legal scholarship.
Like Law and Economics programs, the Federalist Society has reshaped
legal theory by institutionalizing support for conservative intellectualism. It has
infused well over $40 million144 since the mid-1980s in building what founder and
longtime chairman Steven Calabresi explains as a “conservative university
without walls.”145 Far exceeding the resources of feminist or left-leaning student
or faculty groups, leading conservative foundations helped the group amass an
annual budget of over a million dollars within four years of its founding.146 In the
1990s, its annual spending more than doubled and then continued to increase to
more than seven million dollars by 2005 147 with revenue reaching ten million
dollars in 2008.148 Underscoring the connections between Law and Economics
and more overtly conservative ideology, the Olin Foundation developed a close
relationship with the group’s leaders149 and gave the Federalist Society over $5.5
142
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million, including support not just for its namesake fellowships but also for the
group’s initial start-up costs and general operating expenses over several
decades.150
Reaching far beyond individual fellowships, the Federalist Society (like
the Law and Economics programs) is grounded in an understanding of community
as the foundation of giving power to ideas.151 The longstanding and generous
funding for law student chapters’ operation and programming has ensured that
conservative ideas and policy positions are a familiar part of legal education at
virtually all law schools. Moreover, the lavish resources for student group
organizing combined with parallel resources for organizing lawyers and judges
has meant that conservative ideas and arguments are tied to concrete material
rewards for students, from dinners and study materials to a jobs pipeline linked to
leading institutions of government, the judiciary, and the private bar.152 While
other law school organizations typically are dependent on limited general law
school funding for outside speakers’ time and travel, the Federalist Society spends
generously (over one and a half million dollars in 2009)153 to bring conservative
speakers to law schools, with over 1,150 law school events in 2008-09 reaching
over 70,000 people and highlighting several Supreme Court justices (among other
prominent leaders). One study attributed Harvard Law School’s rightward shift
over the last several decades to the Federalist Society’s “veritable empire”
shaping the political and intellectual culture of that school.154 During 2004-05,
for example, Harvard’s Federalist Society organized fourteen events with outside
speakers, monthly colloquia on current legal issues, eleven student-faculty
lunches, and the Federalist Society’s annual National Student Symposium.155 In
addition to these more scholarly events, Harvard’s student chapter in the mid2000s typically organized a barbeque for new students, monthly parties, a
women’s dessert party, an alumni reception, community service activities, career
development panels, and a system for sharing course outlines.156 The national
organization’s ample funding also focuses on rewarding and training students to
become chapter leaders, bringing over two hundred law students to an annual
summer leadership session in Washington, D.C., where they not only learn skills
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and develop their peer networks but also enjoy social events with national leaders
such as Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas.157
As the Federalist Society’s faculty brochure explains, its extensive
resources for student events ensure a wealth of opportunities for legal scholars to
disseminate and develop their work.158 For example, University of Pennsylvania
Law Professor Stephanos Bibas presented a paper on originalism and formalism
in criminal procedure to student chapters at twenty-eight different law schools.159
Further opportunities for publicizing scholarly ideas come from the group’s wellsupported Lawyer’s Division, which spent over six hundred thousand dollars in
2009160 to reach over 26,000 lawyers with events that often featured law
professors.161 This division includes a special chapter for Congressional staff,
connecting them with law faculty and other conservative legal experts for special
educational seminars funded with help from the Heritage Foundation.162
In addition to tailoring services to students and the legal profession, the
Federalist Society has accelerated its structural support for conservative legal
theory through its Faculty Division. By scheduling the Division’s main annual
conference in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Association for
American Law Schools (AALS), this Division helps individual faculty
participants save travel costs and time. This event includes not just the usual
scholarly panels, lectures and debates along with networking and socializing, but
also the opportunity for feedback on individual works-in-progress as well as a
special competition allowing selected junior faculty to have their work featured
and reviewed by a panel of leading scholars.163 In addition, the Faculty Division
recently expanded its programming to feature a series of national colloquia on
particular subject areas, a separate national conference for mentoring junior
faculty, a national job talk workshop to groom prospective faculty members, and
an academic career program for law students.164
Finally, the Federalist Society devotes extensive resources to publicizing
individual faculty scholarship far beyond standard academic and professional
157
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presentations and journals. A media outreach program connects faculty specialists
to the media and to members of the public.165 As part of an extensive effort to
“leverage technology,” the organization’s web site promptly posts scholarly
content from its events in downloadable pdf files or in audio and video form, and
ensures that all of its publications are available electronically; much of this
content also goes on the organization’s YouTube and Facebook sites.166 In
addition, the national Federalist Society supports a scholars’ database providing
individual webpages that link to all the publications and recorded events for each
scholar.167 The web site also distributes several special Federalist Society podcast
series featuring commentary and debates by scholars and others.168 Furthermore,
the Federalist Society’s publications include a White Paper series on current
policy issues, a glossy magazine with three issues a year, an online scholarly
journal with three issues a year, as well as several more practice-oriented
newsletters.169
Nothing remotely comparable to this comprehensive scholarly
development and distribution system has been available for feminist legal
scholarship. The Women in Legal Education section of the AALS is an example
of a gender-related national scholarly organization that regularly sponsors panel
presentations at the AALS annual meeting, along with an annual breakfast and an
occasional newsletter listing recent publications. However, this group has far
narrower scope, relies on the volunteer work of individual law faculty, appears to
command no outside resources, is not connected to students, local organizations,
professionals or politicians, and lacks the overt and unrestrained ideological
freedom and focus of the Federalist Society, whose leadership has remained in the
hands of a small group of founders.170 Furthermore, the standard budget
allocation for AALS sections is $900.171
More comparable is the American Constitution Society (ACS), founded in
2001 explicitly as a liberal counterweight to the Federalist Society. The ACS’s
vision generally includes strong support for equality and economic regulation, and
several influential feminist scholars have been active in the organization (such as
Dawn Johnson and Reva Siegel). The ACS sponsors an array of debates, panels
and lectures through chapters at most U.S. law schools and a somewhat smaller
network of lawyers’ chapters. Like the Federalist Society, the ACS provides
165
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impressive social, educational, and career opportunities through a national
conference structured to connect law faculty and students with leaders in
government and the legal profession, and it supports a web site, journal and other
resources to help disseminate scholarship.172 However, with a substantially
smaller budget, it lacks the programming muscle and breadth of the Federalist
Society.173 It offers no paid fellowships to law faculty, and lacks comparable
structures to organize, support, and distribute legal scholarship. It has no separate
faculty division, no separate law faculty events or mentoring systems, and no
specific programs for aspiring law faculty or junior scholars. Though law faculty
are well represented among the group’s leaders and speakers, and although the
organization distributes a law journal and some books on constitutional
principles,174 the annual convention and chapter activities appear to be largely
attended by and focused on practicing professionals and policy makers.
Moreover, because the Federalist Society is one organization among many
sponsored by activist conservative foundations as part of a broader strategy to
reshape legal academia and public policy, its speakers and events are reinforced
by an academic, legal and political culture saturated with critiques of liberal
support for affirmative action, government health insurance, workers’ rights,
abortion, public education, and social welfare. Although the ACS draws on the
expertise of many liberal advocacy groups, including some focused specifically
on women’s rights, these groups typically offer few independent resources for
supporting or distributing scholarship. Despite its important resources, ACS has
not yet had comparable power to shape legal theory, legal education or the general
public debate over law and policy.175 Similarly, other national law organizations
that tend to be supportive of feminism, like the National Lawyers Guild or the
American Civil Liberties Union, focus even less on law schools, law faculty, and
legal scholarship, though these certainly have contributed to shaping the
intellectual debate on many issues over time. No national organization currently
focuses specifically on promoting feminism in legal academia in the U.S. In
contrast, since 1974, Canadian law students, faculty, and advocates have been
organized through the non-profit National Association of Women and the Law,
which has successfully advanced a number of major law reforms, in addition to
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sponsoring working groups, forums, biennial national conventions, and (more
recently) research grants for feminist scholarship.176

IV. What Can Feminists Do?
The pervasive influence of interested money in legal theory challenges us to think
about how to create and sustain academic institutions where ideas can compete -and coalesce -- on a broader, deeper, and different basis than their appeal to those
who can pay most extravagantly for intellectual legitimation. Indeed, Steven
Teles argues that conservative investments in legal theory have been successful in
part by building institutions structured to foster genuine intellectual debate and
learning insulated from immediate instrumental interests. Despite this degree of
openness, those institutions nonetheless have been carefully controlled to further
particular interests over the long run, by cultivating and sharpening conservative
ideological commitments and by redefining the standards for legal intellectualism.
A. Challenging Conservative Intellectual Neutrality
The problem of nonacademic money for legal theory is not that ideas tied to
nonacademic funding or political movements are necessarily intellectually
suspect, or that all views deserve equal resources. Instead, the primary problem is
that vastly unequal resources in legal academia has served to entrench
questionable conservative premises and commitments as fundamental to
“common sense, intellectual seriousness, responsibility, professionalism,” while
portraying opposing ideas as “off the wall.”177 In his study of the conservative
legal movement’s successful challenge to liberal control of legal academia over
the last half century, Teles concludes that ideas can play a major role in both
sustaining and reversing comprehensive political power.178 Teles underscores the
importance of conservative funders’ long term strategy of harnessing law schools’
power to redefine professionalism by changing the boundaries of “the kinds of
ideas that are held by respectable lawyers”.179
Feminists daunted by the barriers of vastly unequal resources can learn
and perhaps take heart from Teles’s conclusion that a particular point of
vulnerability for dominant regimes is precisely that ability to entrench certain
ideas as neutral professionalism. According to Teles, legal conservativism’s
176
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success shows that powerful regimes remain vulnerable to the clever, committed
and persistent activism by individual intellectual entrepreneurs.180 Henry Manne’s
summer seminar in legal economics, Richard Posner’s sweeping Law and
Economics textbook, and John M. Olin’s creative approach to corporate
philanthropy have each advanced the Law and Economics movement in a
somewhat unfavorable intellectual climate by directly and strategically
challenging rather than accommodating the central assumptions and norms of
liberal legal academia.
Teles’s analysis suggests that feminist scholarship similarly should not shy
away from ambitious efforts to radically rethink the premises taken as neutral and
normal in conservative and centrist law. Furthermore, it suggests the value of
scholarship that directly challenges claims that conservative ideas represent
objective, uncontested, or universal truth, whether grounded in market forces and
supposedly scientific economic priniciples, in purported constitutional originalism
or literalism, or in evolutionary biology or divine creation. In addition, feminists
should confront and subject to intellectual scrutiny the presumed neutral
professionalism of the institutional structures supporting those ideas by
demanding more transparency about outside funding of legal scholarship. Efforts
to increase disclosure should extend not only to the amount and criteria of
nonacademic funding for individual publications, but also to outside-funded
institutions operating within law schools. For example, we should explore
whether academic integrity requires more complete and public disclosure of the
identities, specific economic interests, and degree of control of outside donors and
advisors to academic centers.181 This discussion of transparency should extend to
scholarly events sponsored by student groups such as the Federalist Society
chapters.
Ironically, feminist legal theory’s relative independence from outside
funding can make it more likely to be marginalized as narrowly political or
insubstantial compared to Law and Economics or even compared to many of the
ideas associated with the Federalist Society. Even among nonconservatives,
feminism in law may be identified with outcome-oriented advocacy rather than
rigorous intellectual inquiry in part because many of the institutions most closely
and specifically associated with feminism are primarily practical and political
rather than scholarly in focus.
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Teles’s emphasis on conservative intellectual activists’ power to challenge
the previously dominant liberal intellectual regime understates the extent to which
their entrepreneurial success depended on extensive material support from
powerful and wealthy institutions insulated against ideological change. The
history of feminist legal theory reveals plenty of creative and energetic
entrepreneurs who have lacked material and institutional support comparable to
Law and Economics entrepreneurs. Like Henry Manne in Law and Economics,
Martha Fineman has mentored hundreds of developing legal scholars and has
created the intellectual vision, community, and institutional framework vital to
sustaining a scholarly movement. But unlike Manne, Fineman has not received a
specialized law school to run or regular six-figure checks from corporate donors
to spend on advancing feminism in legal theory. For another example, Catharine
MacKinnon did not secure a tenure track law faculty position until many years
after her writings helped establish feminist jurisprudence as an exciting and farreaching movement.182 In contrast, before he produced his work galvanizing the
Law and Economics movement, Richard Posner had been recruited to the law
faculty of the University of Chicago, where the Volker Fund had already
institutionalized a “safe space” for conservative Law and Economics through a
network of free-market oriented faculty, fellowships and a specialized journal.183
The rise of legal conservativism underscores the importance for feminism
of strategically focusing both theory and resources on building comparable
institutions where risk-taking intellectualism can flourish, based on an
understanding of theory as the product of organization, access to information,
marketing and community as much as individual intelligence and initiative.
Several institutional gaps in support for feminist legal theory offer fertile ground
for investment of scarce resources.
B. Strengthening Institutions for Feminist Theory
First, Teles attributes conservatives’ success in legal academia to their
development of organizations where repeated interactions over a long period
create relationships fostering trust, commitment, and learning (both intellectual
and institutional) among scholars and advocates.184 Fineman’s Feminism and
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Legal Theory project and the LatCrit annual meeting are examples of scholarly
organizations that have fostered long term conversations and strong personal and
professional connections among a group of scholars large enough to have diverse
views and professional connections yet structured to encourage personal
connection and shared commitment. However, many other venues for developing
feminist scholarship are not so conducive to sustained and strong connections,
such as one-time events sponsored by individual law schools, or large gatherings
of scholars with diffuse interests and approaches (like the annual meetings of the
Law and Society and the AALS).
The conservative example suggests that
feminist academics might benefit from concentrating resources on scholarly
gatherings and exchanges aimed at building longer term communities and lasting
institutions, not just individual publications.
Second, conservatives have understood that, over the long run, reshaping
legal theory is a cost-effective and practical way to improve outcomes on specific
law reform projects. Existing national organizations providing long term support
for feminism could go further to follow the lead of the Federalist Society and the
Law and Economics movement in developing more institutional support for
progressive legal theory. For example, the ACS could target more programs and
events focused on scholarship and on mentoring junior faculty, and it could
expand its advocacy to address the conservative institutional pressures in legal
academia, including issues such as rankings reforms, transparency about outside
funding and public support for education. The Society of American Law
Teachers could expand its excellent programs on law teaching, academic freedom,
and law school diversity to more specifically target development of progressive
scholarship. Advocacy groups focused on particular issues could follow the lead
of the Center for Reproductive Rights to support scholarship and to build long
term ties with feminist faculty and feminist law school programs.
Third, resources for feminism should be targeted to increase material
support for the work of initiating and administering scholarly institutions. The
relative lack of institutional and individual resources means that intellectual
organizing work is particular costly for feminist entrepreneurs. Rather than
simply focusing on grants for research, a wish list for feminist philanthropy
should include grants to support (for instance) institution-building and leadership
development for explicitly feminist academic programs.
Finally, the success of conservative legal theory underscores the
importance of building institutions for broadly disseminating scholarship not just
to academics but to the popular media and to advocacy groups, as well as to
political and economic leaders. Feminist academic programs need better funding
for professional staff and other resources to use various media to distribute
scholarship to diverse audiences, particularly as book publishers cut back on
marketing. Teles notes that liberal legal ideas are particularly cut off from
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popular discourse and from grassroots activists.185 Particularly fruitful would be
support for a long term internet presence that could widely distribute feminist
legal ideas and connect individual scholars, events, and publications through
online networks and databases similar to those of the Federalist Society. Feminist
academic institutions should also be better structured to bridge hierarchical
institutional divides that have often isolated legal theory from the work of the
many excellent law school clinics involved in feminist advocacy (in poverty law,
domestic violence, and human rights, for example).
Though feminist philanthropists are unlikely to match the wealth of John
M. Olin, both small and large donors can follow his lead in targeting money and
service to explicitly feminist and progressive rather than to general academic and
professional programs. The conservative example shows that intellectual and
practical credibility and power does not come from distancing legal theory from
ideological commitments, but instead depends on sharpening, animating, and
above all institutionalizing strong political passions and perspectives in legal
theory. More than conservativism, feminist legal theory tends to be (and should
remain) transparent about its commitments and perspectives. Increased
nonacademic funding for openly feminist scholarly institutions will tend to
contribute to rather than obscure and confine robust intellectual debate. Feminist
ideas can go further to upend the power of money and privilege in law if feminist
scholars and advocates both harness and challenge the material foundations of
intellectual power in law.
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